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In 1997, Ira Katznelson contributed to the ongoing
discussion among social scientists and historians
about how to analyze class formation and the devel-
opment of the American state. He was particularly in-
terested in tying this research to the history of
liberalism in an effort to both historicize the gener-
alizations of Louis Hartz and address the question of
American exceptionalism. Evaluating the body of re-
search, Katznelson argued that authors had too fre-
quently abstracted the state from its context and then
used it to explain the very phenomena that helped
define the state’s character in the first place. In part
to imbed the state more concretely in its environ-
ment, he suggested “a shift in angle of vision away
from the state as such to the character of the rules and
institutions that govern the transactions between the
state and civil society.” This shift would also con-
tribute to the study of America’s prevailing liberalism,
which has shaped the environment of the working
class and the state, even while its own particular char-
acter has been the subject of some of the most 
profound divisions in American public life. Using
J. David Greenstone’s work, Katznelson defined lib-
eralism as a “boundary condition,” that is, “‘a set of
relatively permanent features of a particular context
that affect causal relationships within it’ even as it re-
mains subject to dispute.” In times of crisis, conflicts
over liberalism’s “grammar of rules,” or it’s “bundle
of institutions and norms,” spill across the line be-
tween state and civil society, because they involve re-
defining the relation between the two.1
The seemingly parochial history of the Chicago
Flat Janitors’ Union impinges on these conceptual is-
sues, but analyzing exactly how requires the “middle-
range” theory that Katznelson and other social
scientists have long called for. Between 1912 and 1917
the Chicago Flat Janitors’ Union organized the great
majority of the city’s janitors servicing buildings with
apartments, or “flats,” into one huge interracial local
with over 6,000 members, most of them immigrants.2
In 1917, the union won a city-wide contract and a
closed shop in negotiations with Chicago’s largest or-
ganizations of real estate agents and owners, led by
the Chicago Board of Real Estate. Subsequently, con-
tracts were negotiated annually amidst much acrimo-
ny and sometimes violence. By 1920, the city’s most
powerful political faction, the Republicans under
Mayor “Big Bill” Thompson, became regularly in-
volved in resolving the annual disputes through a va-
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In 1921 the Chicago Flat Janitors’ Union became Local 1 of
the new Building Service Employees’ International Union, the pre-
decessor of the SEIU. To help commemorate its 75th anniversary
in 1996, the SEIU sponsored an historical project, which was based
at the Family and Community History Center of the Newberry Li-
brary. This is the third and final article to result from the project.
Earlier versions of this essay profited from critical readings by
James R. Grossman, Bruce C. Nelson, Steven Rosswurm, and
Richard Schneirov. The author would like to thank these critics as
well as the anonymous reviewers for this journal for their insights.
1. Ira Katznelson, “Working-Class Formation and American
Exceptionalism, Yet Again,” in American Exceptionalism? US Working-
Class Formation in an International Context, ed. Rick Halpern and
Jonathan Morris (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 36–55, quo-
tations on 40 and 42.
2. The union’s over 6,000 members were two-thirds immigrant
and one-fifth African American, with the remainder comprised
overwhelmingly of children of immigrants.
riety of arbitrators. By April 1921, the Flat Janitors
were strong enough to form the organizational core
of a new international union affiliated with the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor (AFL) – the Building Ser-
vice Employees’ International Union.3
Within a month, the Flat Janitors’ ten top leaders
were indicted in Chicago’s Circuit Court on a host 
of charges ranging from various acts of violence to
conspiracy. Although initially acquitted in February
1922, the Flat Janitors’ leaders were convicted of con-
spiracy in a second trial five months later. After an ex-
tended court battle and a massive state-wide petition
campaign, the governor of Illinois, who was closely af-
filiated with Thompson’s faction, pardoned all ten
leaders in early 1924.4
Recovering its balance, the Flat Janitors’ Union ex-
panded its labor organizing and enhanced its signifi-
cant role as a player in Chicago politics. During the
years of legal battles, the union maintained its closed
shop and annual labor contracts, preserving the sub-
stantial gains achieved during World War I amidst an
aggressive national open shop campaign by employ-
ers. The union was able to achieve these successes, de-
spite the legal attacks upon it, in part because the
Chicago Board of Real Estate wanted contract nego-
tiations with the Flat Janitors to continue. The Board
also did not support the legal assault on the union to
the extent one would expect, given its public pro-
nouncements. Other business groups pressed the le-
gal case.
The middle-range interpretive concepts needed to
analyze the Flat Janitors’ history have to illucidate the
interrelationships between labor, capital, and politi-
cal parties in a local urban setting. The various works
on politics by labor historians illuminate some of
these relationships, but provide too little guidance on
how capital fits together with both labor and political
parties. The concept of corporatism used to analyze
European industrial democracies ties the three 
elements together; but corporatism does not, in fact,
apply well enough to American conditions. Nonethe-
less, the scholarship on corporatism provides valu-
able insights into the formation and interrelation of
interests. Most appropriate to the case of the Flat Jan-
itors’ Union is the concept of a political cartel that
combines the notion of regulatory unionism in met-
ropolitan economies with that of political factions
and machines.
Since most scholarship on labor and politics in the
Progressive Era concentrates on the policies of the
AFL, it focuses mainly on politics at the state and na-
tional levels. This is also the case with recent studies
that have considerably expanded the scholarly view of
AFL politics beyond the former narrow conceptions
of nonpartisan, even antipolitical, volunarism. In
contrast, community-based labor histories since the
1960s have addressed the role of labor on the local
level more directly, painting a rich picture of labor
politics in industrialized cities and towns. This work
concentrates on moments of upheaval when class-
based political movements took over local govern-
ments, although these moments ended when the
major parties returned to power, commonly by coopt-
ing leaders and issues from the labor movement. Typ-
ically, this scholarship sees the major parties, as well
as the American democratic state at large, as diver-
sionary of labor’s distinctive interests and amielo-
rative of class conflict. An analogous view of the major
parties and the state emerges in the work of political
scientists interested in class formation, although they
draw different implications. Amy Bridges sees alle-
giance to a major party as the central Americanizing
experience of immigrant workers before the Civil
War. Martin Shefter sees craft unions and political
machines defining the distinctive accommodation of
the American working class to the industrial system,
in which its class interests at the workplace were 
separated from working-class politics based in local
communities. Both Bridges and Shefter assume that
unions and political parties pulled workers in differ-
ent directions, a tension that was not experienced by
members of the Flat Janitors’ Union, who were both
politicized and Americanized by an AFL union of un-
skilled workers.5
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3. Katznelson calles for middle-range theory in ibid., 39; The-
da Skocpol refers to it in “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of
Analysis in Current Research,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Pe-
ter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 28; both are referring
the work of Robert Merton. On the history of the Flat Janitors, see
John B. Jentz, “Labor, the Law, and Economics: The Organization
of the Chicago Flat Janitors’ Union, 1902–1917,” Labor History 38
(1997): 413–31; Jentz, “Citizenship, Self-Respect, and Political
Power: Chicago’s Flat Janitors Trailblaze the Service Employees In-
ternational Union, 1912–1921,” Labor’s Heritage 9 (1997): 4–23;
Tom Beadling, Pat Cooper, and Grace Palladino, A Need For Valor:
The Roots of the Service Employees International Union, 1902–1992
(Washington, DC: Service Employees International Union, 1992),
1–15.
4. The history of the Flat Janitors’ Union in the 1920s is pre-
sented subsequently in this article.
5. Monographic reevaluations of the AFL on the national 
level include Victoria C. Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power: The
Origins of Business Unionism in the United States (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1993); Joseph A. McCartin, Labor’s
Great War: The Struggle for Industrial Democracy and thge Origins of
Modern American Labor Relations, 1912–1921 (Chapel Hill: Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press 1997); and Julie Greene, Pure and 
Simple Politics: The American Federation of Labor and Political Activ-
ism, 1881–1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
For overviews of the voluminous scholarship on labor history 
published since the 1960s as it pertains to politics see Greene, “In-
troduction,” in ibid., 4–12; Richard Oestreicher, “Urban Working-
Class Political Behavior and Theories of American Electoral
Politics, 1870–1940,” Journal of American History 74 (1988): 1257–
86; David Brody, “Labor Movement,” in Encyclopedia of American Po-
litical History: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas, ed. Jack P.
Greene, 3 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons), 2:709–27. For
political scientists interested in class formation and the state see
Amy Bridges, “Becoming American: The Working Classes in the
United States before the Civil War,” and Martin Shefter, “Trade
Unions and Political Machines: The Organization and Dissorgani-
zation of the American Working Class in the Late Nineteenth Cen-
Most important, practically all this scholarship by
labor historians and political scientists uses the major
parties and the state as independent variables to help
explain working-class life. Rarely does the working
class use the established political order for its own
ends. In Katznelson’s terms, “the state was treated as
a cause; working-class thought and behaviour as ef-
fects” – an analysis he considers a “partial truth.”6
The other part of this truth can be seen in the Flat
Janitors’ successful use of Thompson’s political fac-
tion to achieve their own ends, which were usually to
keep the state, in the form of the courts, at bay. In the
era of injunctions, this goal was in the mainstream of
AFL politics, even if the partisan involvement of the
Flat Janitors was not. Recent labor histories have ad-
dressed some of these difficulties and will be used to
help evaluate the import of the political cartel in
which the Flat Janitors took part. It is important to
add here that the scholarship addressing class forma-
tion and the state also lacks a model that adequately
includes the role of capital in the urban political
economy.
The concept of corporatism has the virtue of being
a middle-range theory incorporating the state, labor,
and capital. As used by social scientists, corporatism
describes a political and economic system composed
of a limited number of monopoly interests, usually
representatives of capital and labor, linked to the
state through a combination of mutual interest and
delegated public authority. Through their relation-
ship with the state, the interests obtain compulsory or
semi-compulsory membership. Although corporatist
systems can perform regulatory functions in particu-
lar industries, they typically have defined national
policies on wages and prices – particularly in Euro-
pean industrial democracies after World War II, such
as Sweden and Austria.
According to this model, the relationship with the
state is critical. As Alan Cawson notes, corporatist 
“organizations have a privileged status with respect 
to government in that they co-determine public pol-
icy and are responsible for its implementation by 
disciplining their members to accept bargained
agreements.” Sanctioned by the government, either
formally or informally, corporatist organizations de-
velop a mutually interdependent relationship with
the state that blurs the line between public and pri-
vate spheres. Maintaining a corporatist system usu-
ally requires that all parties compromise their maxi-
mum goals for the benefits that come with being on
the inside, such as predictable costs, regular wage
increases, or accommodating public officials. Legiti-
macy is an problem for corporatist systems, since the
organizations have to justify compromise to their
members and their monopoly status to the public.7
While most scholars do not find corporatism in the
United States, seeing the political culture as hostile 
to it or the institutional preconditions for it as too
weak, the system of labor-management relations that
emerged in Chicago’s residential real estate industry
after the 1917 contract had some distinct “family re-
semblances” to a corporatist system.8 The Chicago
system arose from a condition of “mutual deterrence”
between capital and labor in the industry – a condi-
tion, in Philippe Schmitter’s terms, in which each
could check the other from realizing fundamental
goals while neither was capable of “unilateral manip-
ulation of public authority to impose its interests 
indirectly through the state.”9 Their annual negotia-
tions emerged from this standoff; through these ne-
gotiations, the union and the real estate interests
defined wages and work rules that regulated and sta-
bilized the rental market in housing and the services
provided within it. Nevertheless, the hostility between
the union and the real estate interests regularly threat-
ened the negotiations to the point where Mayor
Thompson’s political faction began to systematically
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tury,” in Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in West-
ern Europe and the United States, ed. Ira Katznelson and Aristide R.
Zolberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 157–
276.
6. Katznelson, “Working-Class Formation and American Ex-
ceptionalism, Yet Again,” 53.
7. Alan Cawson, “Corporatism,” in The Blackwell Encyclopedia of
Political Thought, ed. David Miller (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987),
104–6, quote on 104. Corporatism as used in this essay corresponds
more precisely to Cawson’s definitions of meso-corporatism and mi-
cro-corporatism (or local corporatism), terms which he applies to po-
litical and economic activity below the national or macro levels: see
Cawson, “Corporatism and Local Politics,” in The Political Economy
of Corporatism, ed. Wyn Grant (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985),
126–47; Cawson, ed., Organized Interests and the State: Studies in Meso-
Corporatism (London: Sage, 1985); Cawson, Corporatism and Political
Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
Also especially important for defining corporatism as under-
stood here are Philippe C. Schmitter, “Neo-Corporatism and the
State,” in Political Economy, 32–62; Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe
C. Schmitter, “Community, Market, State – Associations? The
Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order,”
in Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State, ed. Streeck
and Schmitter (London: Sage, 1985), 1–29.
8. For a discussion of how the concept of corporatism applies
to the United States below the macro level, see H. Brinton Milward
and Ronald A. Francisco, “Subsystem Politics and Corporatism in
the United States,” Policy and Politics 11 (1983): 273–93; Larry C.
Gerber, “Corporatism and State Theory: A Review Essay for Histo-
rians,” Social Science History 19 (1995): 318–19.
For articles finding corporatism non-existent or weak in the
United States see Graham K. Wilson, “Why Is There No Corpo-
ratism in the United States?” in Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making,
ed. Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe C. Schmitter (London: Sage
Publications, 1982), 219–35; Colin Gordon, “Why No Corporatism
in the United States? Business Disorganization and its Conse-
quences,” Business and Economic History 27 (1998): 29–46.
The literature on corporatism has been voluminous since
Philippe C. Schmitter revived discussion of the idea with his semi-
nal essay: “Still the Century of Corporatism?” The Review of Politics
36 (1974): 85–131. Two review essays have been particularly help-
ful to this author: Wolfgang Streeck, “Einleitung des Herausgebers.
Staat und Verbaende: Neue Fragen. Neue Antworten?” Politische
Vierteljahresschrift. Sonderheft 25 (1994): 7–21, and Gerber, “Corpo-
ratism and State Theory,” 313–32.
9. Schmitter, “Neo-corporatism and the State,” 36–38, quote
on 36.
intervene to help insure stability and success, a task it
performed with the support of the two contenders. It
is imporant to note that the government, as distinct
from Thompson’s organization, never officially sanc-
tioned the system, either by passing ordinances defin-
ing its authority and powers or by setting up a formal
public institution to manage it. Moreover, participants
in the Chicago system did not want state involvement
and the legal constraints that came with it.
The absence of the state is the main reason why this
was not corporatism, despite the system’s performing
tasks similar to one, such as setting prices and en-
forcing agreements. The absence of the state also sup-
ports those critics of corporatism who argue that the
institutional supports for it – in this case the state –
are too weak to sustain it in the United States. If cor-
poratism does not apply, what middle-range concept
does?10
It is more accurate to think of the Chicago labor-
management system as a distinct cartel. Cartels have
existed in the United States both with and without the
involvement of the government. A private cartel is an
exclusive alliance of businesses that sets prices and di-
vides up markets. Private cartels are inherently un-
stable because of the numerous incentives and
opportunities for cheating, and thus detection of vi-
olators and enforcement of agreements are central
problems for them. The Chicago system distin-
guished itself by being an alliance of businesses with
a huge labor union, and thus it was not a standard pri-
vate cartel. It was also unusually stable because one of
the union’s roles was in fact to detect and punish vio-
lators; its efficiency in performing this task stabilized
the system.
Unions played this regulatory role in other indus-
tries, including coal mining, where the United Mine
Workers enforced collectively bargained agreements
against recalcictrant employers. A regulatory role by
unions was more common, however, in those indus-
tries operating in metropolitan markets and charac-
terized by numerous, fiercely competitive small
enterprises, such as baking (especially bread), brew-
ing, printing, and clothing manufacture. In the nee-
dle trades, for example, according to Colin Gordon,
unions regulated the labor market and competition
among employers, mainly because uniform pay scales
elminiated wages as a tool for competitive advantage.
Ironically, one of the main problems for unions in
such industries was the weakness of employers associ-
ations with whom they had to deal. Because such as-
sociations were weak, “it invariably fell to the unions
they bargained with to enforce not only the terms of
agareements but the fealty of individual employers.”
This was certainly one of the roles played by the Flat
Janitors’ Union in the collective bargaining system
that emerged in 1917 and lasted through the 1920s.11
If this system was not a typical private cartel, it was
not a standard public one either. American public
cartels (for example, railroads) have been managed
by a federal regulatory bodies. Regulating bodies,
and the federal laws creating them, have been pre-
conditions of public cartels for some of the same rea-
sons that corporatism finds it so hard to take root
here: the American political and legal traditions con-
tain individualistic ideas of liberty, entrepreneurial
values, and market concepts hostile to managing mar-
kets and constraining liberty through collectivist 
institutions. Special federal legislation has been re-
quired to protect public cartels from such ideas and
values codified in other federal laws such as the Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act of 1890 with its ban on “every con-
tract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade.” The Chicago labor-management system dis-
cussed here, of course, lacked such legislative protec-
tion, which was the main reason it needed a political
alliance to protect it. Here, the system will be called a
political cartel to recognize it as an economic system
with a political alliance at its core. In Chicago during
the 1920s the cartel involved a huge union local play-
ing a regulatory role, a wealthy and powerful real 
estate association that nonetheless lacked strong con-
trols over its own memebers, and the city’s strongest
political faction, which could protect the arrange-
ment from legal and political attack but also sorely
needed the organizational and financial resources
the other players in the system could provide.12
A political cartel emerged in Chicago’s residential
real estate industry after the Flat Janitors’ successful
organizing campaign between 1912 and 1917. The
Flat Janitors then used the system to deflect a legal at-
tack in the early 1920s, to substantially increase their
members’ standard of living, and to make themselves
a power in both local politics and the Chicago labor
movement.
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10. On the centrality of state involvement to corporatism sys-
tems, see Cawson, “Corporatism,” 104; Schmitter, “Still the Centu-
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Transformation of Politics, ed. Berger (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
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Newman, 4 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1987), 1:372–74; Alexis
Jacquemin and Margaret E. Slade, “Cartels, Collusion, and Hori-
zontal Merger,” in Handbook of Industrial Organization, ed. Richard
Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: North Hol-
land, 1989), 1:417, 424–25. Sherman Anti-Trust Act as cited in
Leonard W. Levy, et al., Encyclopedia of the American Constitution,
4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 4:1679.
FROM UNION LOCAL, THROUGH INTEREST GROUP, 
TO POLITICAL CARTEL: THE FLAT JANITORS UNION
FROM 1912 TO 1921
Organizing for the Chicago Flat Janitors’ Union be-
gan in 1912 under the leadership of William F.
Quesse, who had been involved in an unsuccessful or-
ganizing effort from 1902 to 1905. One of the lessons
he drew from this previous experience was to con-
centrate on the owners of modest-sized apartment
buildings spread throughout Chicago’s residential
neighborhoods, rather than contest with the power-
ful interests holding large office buildings in the
Loop, the city’s central business district. Such resi-
dential buildings contained from a few to twenty or
more apartments, with the average being around
eight to ten dwellings each. The typical janitor ser-
viced about three buildings to support his family.13
Thus, the average flat janitor had several employers,
which made organizing janitors very expensive, since
the union had to deal with more than one owner to
gain one member. On the other hand, any one em-
ployer had a modest stake in his janitor, because he
hired a fraction of his time. Given this small invest-
ment, and faced with a persistent union, the small
owners and their agents usually compromised. Those
who did not filled the ranks of organizations that
fought the union, legally and politically. The union
engaged in constant legal battles, particularly against
numerous injunctions issued by judges friendly to
employers. One of these injunctions, issued by Judge
Dennis Sullivan in early 1915, was so sweeping that it
caught the worried attention of Samuel Gompers,
who was prematurely celebrating the Clayton Anti-
Trust Act of 1913 as a bulwark against judicial inter-
ference in labor activity. In addition to injunctions,
the union’s leaders also fought any rival labor orga-
nizations that attempted to organize flat janitors.14
By 1916, after four years of grueling organizing, the
union controlled enough apartment buildings to bid
for a city-wide contract with the largest organizations
of building agents and owners, led by the Chicago
Real Estate Board.15 At this time, the union’s 6,000
members comprised well over half of all flat janitor’s
in the city. Standing on this strong foundation, the
union initiated a period of intense maneuvering in
November 1916 by demanding a contract that would
begin January 1. In response, the real estate organi-
zations threatened to expel janitors from the apart-
ments they received as part of their compensation,
while the Flat Janitors called selected strikes against
owners refusing to hire union janitors. Faced with no
heat during Chicago’s severe winter, tenants across
the city organized to take over building services. The
union demanded that one militant owners group be
expelled from the negotiations; it had sponsored le-
gal challenges to its organizing since 1914, including
the one that produced the Sullivan injunction. After
weeks of threats and recriminations, and as the dead-
line of January 1 approached, this controversial own-
ers group was pushed out of the negotiations.16
The agents and owners then made a new demand –
that the wages of janitors be prorated according to
the varied rents charged in different parts of the city.
One of the biggest complaints of building owners was
that the uniform city-wide wage scale demanded by
the union would be unfair to those in less desirable
neighborhoods earning less money from their build-
ings. This complaint was not unusual. Such divisions
among more and less profitable businesses typified,
for example, the coal industry when it negotiated la-
bor contracts with the United Mine Workers. The
coal industry’s final agreement included a provision
for “competitive equality” that allowed mine owners
with less profitable mines to pay less wages than the
norm.17 Needing a similar provision to accommodate
their members, the Chicago real estate organizations
demanded a “sliding scale” of wages; but by accepting
it the union would have to give up its cherished prin-
ciple of equal pay for equal work. It had always want-
ed wages determined simply by the number and size
of apartments serviced. On this point the union com-
promised.18
With accommodations made on both sides, an
agreement fell into place. The janitors received a
wage increase, averaging about 7 percent, and better
working conditions. The sliding scale was agreed to,
but precise details were postponed to subsequent ne-
gotiations, since the issue was so controversial and
complex. An arbitration mechanism was set up to re-
solve disputes with a mediator agreed to by both par-
ties. The union could not strike or picket a building
while a dispute was under arbitration. Such arbitra-
tion mechanisms had been a goal of the janitors since
they began organizing in 1902; and the procedures
were patterned after similar ones proposed in the
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16. Jentz, “Labor, the Law, and Economics,” 427–28.
17. Bowman, “When Workers Organize Capitalists,” 298.
18. Jentz, “Labor, the Law, and Economics,” 428–29.
Chicago construction industry and elsewhere in the
last two decades of the nineteenth century. Finally,
and most important for the Flat Janitors’ Union, the
owners agreed to hire only its members: the Flat Jan-
itors had a closed shop, a provision that meant the
end of rival unions. The union achieved its victory
with fewer than 200 of its 6,000 members going out
on strike. There were two keys to the union’s success:
it had organized most of the flat janitors in the city be-
fore it initiated negotiations for a contract; and it op-
erated in an industry with a metropolitan market. In
such a market it was feasible for a union as strong as
the Flat Janitors to protect unionized employers from
nonunion competition, creating more room to ma-
neuver for both parties in labor negotiations.19
The 1917 contract came just a few months before
the United States entered World War I. This con-
juncture of events had significant import for the
union leaders’ ability to transform their organization
into one of the key interest groups in the city, a status
it achieved by the early 1920s. As an interest group –
acting beyond the narrow confines of labor contracts
and within the power blocs that ruled Chicago – the
Flat Janitors’ Union was able to shape the political
and economic environment in which it operated. In
so doing, it performed intermediary functions typical
of organizations in corporatist systems, such as shap-
ing and articulating the interests of the membership,
making and enforcing policies with broad public im-
port, and bargaining with institutional opponents
and the government for whole sectors of an industry,
although the Flat Janitors dealt with the city’s most
powerful political organization, not with government
agencies.20
Building a politically powerful interest group de-
manded much of the union’s members. Over two-
thirds of them were immigrants working in one of the
lowest status jobs in the city. Like other unskilled
workers in the United States, these men moved about
incessantly, from job to job and city to city; and thus
they had little commitment to particular institutions
and lacked the persistence in one place required for
political participation. The 1917 contract made jani-
torial jobs more desirable and thus worth maintain-
ing. The union’s leaders also used the war effort to
change the way the members thought about them-
selves. The Flat Janitors’ Union enthusiastically
joined patriotic drives to buy war bonds, and it
trained its members to burn scarce coal more effi-
ciently to contribute to the war effort. The union also
required all foreign-born members who were not cit-
izens to start the process of naturalization. These de-
velopments helped the immigrant members build
attachments to the country, their jobs, and the union –
bonds which made them more reliable trade union-
ists and more active citizens whom the union could
involve in political campaigns.21
Different causes produced similar results for the
one-fifth of the membership composed of African-
Americans. Blacks were less transient because racial
prejudice pushed them to keep the few jobs they
could get. The Flat Janitors’ policy against racial, eth-
nic, and class prejudice made keeping janitorial jobs
in Chicago even more desirable. In 1916, Quesse
wrote,
We are . . . composed of all creeds, colors and
nationalities, and do not allow anyone to use
any prejudice in the organization against each
other, for when we first organized we had
everything in our organization from an ex-
bank cashier to a common laborer.22
The union’s goals help explain this highly unusual
policy: Quesse and his fellow leaders wanted to con-
trol Chicago’s labor market in flat janitors, and thus
they had to organize the large number of African
American janitors. Nevertheless, the leaders might
have followed the typical path of organizing a sepa-
rate black local; but they were as strongly opposed to
any rival organizations of janitors as they were to
racial and ethnic prejudice. African American jani-
tors responded to the union’s policies not only by
joining but also by taking leadership positions. In
1919, one-third of the Flat Janitors’ executive board
was black.23
While the 1917 contract made the union member-
ship even more attractive to African Americans, World
War I transformed the black community in Chicago,
increasing it dramatically and mobilizing it politically.
By stopping immigration, the war helped stimulate
the great migration of African Americans out of the
South to jobs in the North’s booming war economy.
Already possessing an experienced political leader-
ship, black Chicago grew enormously within the in-
creasingly dense confines imposed by segregation.
Racial tensions grew, but so did the political signifi-
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cance of black Chicago, particularly to politicians like
Mayor Thompson, who was first elected in 1915 with
substantial support from African American voters.
Chicago’s expanding Black Belt became an integral
part of Thompson’s coalition. The substantial African
American role in the Flat Janitors’ Union made it eas-
ier for the organization to form an alliance with
Thompson that lasted throughout the 1920s.24
World War I did more than bring blacks to the
North and enforce patriotism on immigrants. The
Wilsonian liberalism used to justify America’s role in
the war provided Quesse and his fellow leaders with
an opportunity to define democracy and American-
ism in ways useful to the union. It was easy to link the
war to make “the world safe for democracy” to the
union’s own struggle to “gain a little democracy in 
the field wherein we earned our livelihood.”25 This
rhetorical tactic was adopted by numerous unions
during World War I. The war effort legitimated im-
porting a political concept like democracy into the
workplace along with the patriotic drives to buy war
bonds and burn less coal. Bringing democracy to
work affected more than relations with employers.
For years, Quesse had promoted a civic ethic of self-
respect and citizenship among the janitors; the war
helped him enhance both while linking the union’s
demands for higher wages and better working condi-
tions to Americanism.26
Both the country and the union were fighting for
the “American way,” which Quesse interpreted to in-
clude a higher standard of living for his members.
Drawing deeply from the AFL’s ideology, Quesse de-
fined the “American Standard” as more than better
apartments and higher wages: it also meant re-
spectability in the way janitors interacted with other
people, in how their families lived, and in their civic
involvement. As he said, “We are an organization of
gentlemen, doing business in a courteous way.”
Quesse expected to be treated the same way by em-
ployers and tenants, just as he demanded a higher
standard of behavior from his members. After win-
ning the 1917 labor contract, the union set out to get
“a better class of workmen in our organization,” and
this included men who treated their wives with
greater respect. For example, when union leaders
found pregnant wives doing janitorial work while the
janitor was drinking in a saloon, Quesse actively set
the organization to stopping such behavior. In doing
so, he probably drew heavily on his strong Roman
Catholicism to define what it meant to be a husband
and father. The union was creating the economic pos-
sibility for respectable family life, while at the same
time defining it for the members; and such family life
was at the core of the union’s vision of the American
standard of living. The opposite of the American stan-
dard was a kind of bondage, and the union justified
itself to the members as their liberator from this de-
graded state. This message resonated with members
who had experienced substantial benefits following
the 1917 contract. Reinforced with fraternal ritual,
such as secret passwords, the bonds forged between
the members and with the leadership during the war
years survived ethnic and racial tensions as well as le-
gal attacks on the union in the 1920s.27
Quesse and his fellow leaders used the opportuni-
ties provided by the 1917 contract and World War I to
mold an interest group out of class sentiments, fra-
ternal ritual, AFL ideology, wartime patriotism, and
Wilsonian liberalism. They acted like “interest entre-
preneurs,” in the words of Wolfgang Streeck.28 Their
achievement illustrated a point made by students of
corporatism – that the leaders of interest groups do
not represent the previously formulated opinions of
their members so much as actively mold those opin-
ions in the process of defining the culture of their or-
ganization.29 The culture of the Flat Janitors’ Union
performed some of the same functions that Dorothy
Sue Cobble found in the waitress’s unions she stud-
ied. In both cases, their organizational culture sus-
tained solidarity, gave members the self-confidence to
enforce contract provisions and work rules, and cre-
ated a pride in their occupation as a craft. Backed by
detailed work rules, this pride improved the quality
of their work, making them more desirable employ-
ees. The result for the waitresses and the janitors was,
in Cobble’s terms, “occupational unionism,” which
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adapted the model of craft unions to fit low-skilled oc-
cupations in industries characterized by numerous
small, dispersed employers. In such industries, the
culture of the organization, not the work site, had to
provide the locus of solidarity.30 For the janitors, this
organizational creativity produced more than anoth-
er big union local. Huge, disciplined, and brilliantly
led, the Flat Janitors’ Union formed a powerful in-
terest group able to maneuver at the center of the
city’s politics and economy. And, as it maneuvered 
in Chicago’s power centers, it became part of, as it
helped create, a political cartel.
The negotiations for the 1920 and 1921 labor con-
tracts illustrated how this cartel evolved. Late in 1919,
the Flat Janitors announced their demands and fixed
a deadline of November 27 for the employers who
had broken the existing contract. The majority of
owners who had kept the contract had until January
1. There was widespread dissatisfaction among 
owners with the current contract because postwar in-
flation was automatically increasing janitors’ wages –
the result of the “sliding scale,” which tied the wage
rate to the income from buildings. A bomb explosion
at the apartment building where Quesse lived height-
ened tensions. Shortly afterwards, Quesse walked out
of negotiations with the building owners when they
rejected the Flat Janitors’ wage demands. The owners
called for the aid of tenants in running struck build-
ings, threatened to throw striking janitors out of their
apartments, and assessed owners to build a fund to re-
sist the anticipated strike. As tensions mounted, ne-
gotiations became more serious. By December 7, the
union and owners had reached an agreement raising
wages 10 to 20 percent and expanding the closed
shop to cover not only janitors but all people em-
ployed by the owners, a provision mainly affecting the
building trades, who were close but suspicious allies
of the Flat Janitors’ Union. The new contract also
continued the central features of earlier contracts, in-
cluding the arbitration mechanism.31
This 1920 agreement covered three-fourths of all
apartments in the city, “leaving the janitors to deal
with the other owners,” in the words of the Tribune.32
When the union struck the holdouts’ buildings after
January 1, Ivan O. Ackley, a leader of the Chicago
Real Estate Board, said,
The owners affected by the strike are isolated
men who handle their own buildings and are
not represented in the agents’ association . . . .
Any man who failed to sign the agreement is
not keeping faith with the association. The
men who have strikes on their shoulders have
them on their own responsibility.33
In other words, Ackley was glad to throw the recalci-
trant owners to the Flat Janitors. In this year, at least,
the holdouts did not put up much of a fight: a short
strike of 250 janitors – out of over 6,000 in the union –
forced them into line.34
These events illustrated how the Flat Janitors
helped the real estate organizations discipline their
constituency, and not only by striking against the
holdouts. As Ackley’s statement reveals, the recalci-
trant owners did more than not sign the contract:
they also refused to hire a building agent or join one
of the agents’ associations negotiating with the jani-
tors. At this time, the Chicago Board of Real Estate
was composed of agents who managed buildings; the
organization began to directly recruit property own-
ers within the next few years. Rejecting both agents
and representation by their associations, the holdouts
should not, in Ackley’s opinion, receive the benefits
that the agents’ associations provided, including pro-
tection from the Flat Janitors. These recalcitrant own-
ers were in an analogous relation to the real estate
associations as non-union janitors were to the union,
and they were dealt with similarly. Ackley’s frustration
with the recalcitrants may have stemmed from con-
siderable efforts to recruit them earlier. In the previ-
ous year, the real estate associations had competed
among themselves to expand their memberships.
The Chicago Board of Real Estate dropped its initia-
tion fee from $200 to $50 in this competition. The
Board’s leadership in negotiating the 1920 contract
with the Flat Janitors helped consolidate its preemi-
nence among the city’s real estate organizations. As
the Flat Janitors’ Union struggled to organize new
members and win better contracts, it was also stimu-
lating the organization of the industry’s numerous
capitalists into comprehensive associations with which
it could negotiate city-wide agreements.35
The next year’s negotiations were so difficult that
the city’s political leadership intervened, beginning a
long-term involvement in the real estate industry’s la-
bor relations. This involvement marked the final
stage in the evolution of the cartel. After the 1917
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contract victory, Quesse had taken the Flat Janitors
into Mayor Thompson’s coalition. The union’s multi-
ethnic and interracial membership fit well with
Thompson’s strong constituencies among African
Americans and “old” immigrants – Irish, Germans,
and Scandinavians. Thompson also needed the
union’s unusual organizational strength. Although
Big Bill was strong on political showmanship, his
weakness in organizational skills meant that his sup-
porters remained a faction unable to survive without
his leadership. Thus, Thompson did not build a gen-
uine political machine, the honor for which went to
the Democrats in the 1930s. Thompson’s weakness,
particularly in precinct organization, was the Flat Jan-
itors’ opportunity, for the union had members in
every ward who could put up signs, talk to voters, help
people to the polls – the grassroots activities needed
in American elections. The Flat Janitors’ Union was a
ready-made, city-wide precinct organization with a
staff of over 6,000.36
One result of Quesse’s political alliance was the ar-
bitration of the 1921 contract by William Fitzmorris,
Big Bill’s newly appointed Chief of Police. A political
insider, Fitzmorris had previously run the mayor’s of-
fice. With the annual negotiations stalemated, the
Flat Janitors and the real estate interests agreed on
Fitzmorris as arbitrator; after appropriate delibera-
tions, he extended the 1920 contract for another year
with only modest modifications. Although the union
did not get the wage increases it had demanded, Fitz-
morris’s decision was in fact a major union victory,
won in the face of successful open-shop campaigns
across the nation. By preserving the Flat Janitors’
wartime gains, Fitzmorris’s arbitration helped the
union’s leaders justify to the members the political
exertions demanded of them as well as the compro-
mises needed to obtain the agreement. Fitzmorris’s
involvement also helped sanction to the public the
privileged roles which the Flat Janitors’ Union and
the Chicago Board of Real Estate had claimed in de-
termining the price of apartment housing in Chica-
go. Although new and unstable, the system was clear,
especially to outsiders, who hurled accusations of cor-
ruption.37
Much of what accusers called corruption, particu-
larly the union’s levying of fines, resulted from the
Flat Janitors’ role in the cartel. Cartels among busi-
nesses have always had trouble enforcing their agree-
ments, and the more participants they have the
greater the problems. With thousands of members
and weak internal sanctions, the Chicago real estate
associations actually delegated enforcement to the
union, although, of course, they never publicly ac-
knowledged this. (As noted earlier, this situation was
unusual but not unique: the United Mine Workers
performed a similar function in the bituminous coal
industry.) The Flat Janitors’ Union agreed to carry
the weight of enforcement, since its members were
the most likely to suffer from contract violations. For
enforcement to be successful, the union’s members
had to be responsible enough to know the contract,
insist on its enforcement in the face of owners and
agents, and complain to union officials if it was vio-
lated – tasks requiring assertiveness, tact, and the self-
respect that Quesse talked so much about. If the
janitor could not handle the problem, the union’s
business agents had to step in using arguments and
threats to gain compliance. And, if all else failed, the
union called a strike against the building. Its pickets
not only stopped janitorial services but also the team-
sters’ deliveries of coal, ice, milk, beer, and gro-
ceries.38
Given the thousands of apartment building own-
ers, the union was always striking buildings across the
city, although Quesse never took the whole local out
on strike. A strike of all the janitors would have been
very costly and would likely have brought interven-
tion by public authorities against a threat to the well-
being of so large a portion of the citizenry. To carry
out the day-to-day strikes against particular owners
the union simply used some of its own employees as
full-time pickets, a task that provided an entry level
job with the organization. If the strike ended with a
union victory, the Flat Janitors’ Union imposed a fine
on the owner. To most owners the fine was simple 
extortion and its imposition by the union an affront,
despite the fact that the union was enforcing an
agreement negotiated with associations to which
practically all the owners belonged. The union, of
course, saw itself as carrying most of the burden of
maintaining the annual agreement and thus felt jus-
tified in recovering its costs, as well as getting the ben-
efits owed its members, including back wages owed.
In these cases, what the owners – and practically all
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newspapers – called corruption was the enforcement
of a collectively bargained labor agreement sanc-
tioned by the city’s most powerful political faction.39
More was meant by the charges of corruption, how-
ever. Union officials were accused of personally tak-
ing the money paid in fines, and the union was
charged with multiple forms of coercion. If Quesse
took money for himself, he did not spend it on con-
spicuous consumption. During the formative years of
the union between 1912 and the early 1920s, Quesse’s
family lived in several apartments in a South Side
neighborhood anchored by Corpus Christi Roman
Catholic Church, where his children attended
school. Populated by families of skilled workers and
small proprietors, the area became part of Chicago’s
Black Belt while the family lived there. When Quesse
died in 1927, at the age of forty-eight, his family lived
in Rogers Park, a middle-class neighborhood on the
North Side. He left an estate that allowed his family
to maintain a comfortable middle-class life.40
Charges of coercion were easier to establish, de-
pending on what was meant. In protracted strikes the
union resorted to sabotage against the struck build-
ings. This violence against property had an almost rit-
ual quality. When a building owner hired a non-union
janitor late in 1914, union representatives sought out
the man and demanded that he quit his job or join
the union by the next day. When they returned and
found that he had not complied, they said, “‘Well, we
will do ours then.’” That included picketing, leaving
a furnace door open so coal gases filled the building,
dumping garbage in the vestibule, and setting off
“stink bombs.” Such tactics during strikes were typi-
cally part of a tit-for-tat escalating cycle of violence.
Two bombings at the apartment buildings where
Quesse’s family lived were extreme examples. More
commonly, the owners hired private guards who ha-
rassed and sometimes beat up the union’s pickets. Or,
quite often, sympathetic city police performed the
same service for the owners free of charge. Conflicts
between labor and capital in Chicago had been, and
would remain, permeated with violence; and the Flat
Janitors delivered as well as received in this rough ac-
tion. While none of this will surprise students of
Chicago history, it is most important to note how the
union’s use of coercion fit with its role in the cartel.
In using sabotage, the union was doing the dirty work
of enforcing the annual labor agreement for the real
estate associations as well as itself, and, indirectly, for
Big Bill Thompson too, a substantial real estate own-
er himself. Thompson relied on both the union and
the real estate interests to help sustain his organiza-
tion, as well as manage the market in rental housing
through the cartel.41
The issue of coercion also pertained to rival unions
and power relations within the organization. To pre-
serve its closed shop, for example, the union had to
insure that there were no rival labor organizations,
much less owners hiring non-union labor. One group
of janitors claimed to be just a mutual benefit society,
but the union thought otherwise and picketed the
building where the president worked until he re-
signed from the organization or was fired by his em-
ployer. The Flat Janitors also opposed the formation
of an African American local in the early 1920s, and
rumors of violence surrounded such incidents. The
rumors, in fact, helped keep the members in line, as
well as building owners. In 1915, candidates running
against Quesse and the other sitting leaders of the
union claimed that they were beaten up by “sluggers,”
or hired thugs. Despite union denials, the rival can-
didates got an injunction in their favor, but lost their
political bid anyway. Quesse probably saw this partic-
ular slate of candidates as the officers of a former ri-
val local tying to take over his new union.42
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In these cases, the Flat Janitors were acting like par-
ticipants in corporatist systems anxious to preserve
their special status as sole arbiters of their domains.
Coercion was probably more frequently required to
maintain the cartel than would otherwise have been
the case in a corporatist system because the cartel
lacked the public legitimacy such arrangements ob-
tain from official sanctioning by the state. The Flat
Janitors were also acting like an institution under
siege, a common state for American trade unions,
and particularly for this union. Steve Fraser has writ-
ten that,
Frequently formed under beleaguered condi-
tions, it’s hardly a surprise the union executive
is vested with extraordinary powers, not dis-
similar to a nation under siege and prone to
the same suspension of full democratic lib-
erties. (After all, the union shop is a kind of
compulsory form of solidarity.) Except that in
America there’s hardly ever a truce, much less
a lasting peace, in the war against unions.43
The legal attack on the union in the 1920s illustrated
why the Flat Janitors were always in combat readiness.
The political cartel that had emerged by the early
1920s provided a platform of power that Quesse used
to advance the union in Chicago’s economy and pol-
itics. He did more than make the union an organiza-
tional base for Thompson’s political faction. He also
testified at City Council hearings on zoning and
building codes, promoting public health issues such
as banning outdoor privies as well as providing better
apartments for janitors. He worked with public of-
ficials trying to reduce air pollution, the “smoke 
menace,” by training janitors to burn coal more effi-
ciently. In such ways, he built alliances with reform
groups, which sometimes aided the union’s organiz-
ing efforts. Quesse was by no means unique in this re-
gard; unions and political bosses, including Big Bill
Thompson, have proven adept at supporting selected
progressive causes for their own ends and thus have
contributed to urban liberalism. More important,
Quesse’s promoting of reform interests shaped a
more positive public perception of the union, which
helped it justify its special status in the cartel.44
Of equal importance, Quesse made the Flat Jani-
tors a pillar of the Chicago labor movement. Histori-
an Barbara Newell has argued that three types of
unions – teamster, building trades, and building ser-
vice – formed a stable “triumvirate” at the core of
Chicago labor. Most prominently represented by the
Flat Janitors, the building service workers were the
last of the three to establish a stable power base. All
three types of unions used solidarity and political
power to schieve dominance in particular metropoli-
tan markets. Such markets had special characteristics
well defined by Richard Schneirov:
(1) a relative inability of employers to substi-
tute capital and machinery for labor inputs,
(2) extensive capital at risk per worker, (3) vul-
nerability of capital to damage or short-term
disruption by workers, and (4) a secure market
for a firm’s products.
Operating in such a market, the apartment rental in-
dustry had all these qualities, plus thousands of own-
ers, making it relatively “immune from tendencies
toward mass production and corporate ownership.”45
Contrary to the stereotype of American labor be-
fore the 1930s, the power and stability of these Chica-
go unions did not depend on organizing pockets of
skilled craftsmen, but rather on controlling metro-
politan labor markets in which they tried to protect
unionized businesses from non-union competition.
Colin Gordon has found examples of such “metro-
politan unionism” in the Progressive Era through
World War II, noting that they constituted “important
episodes in the history of American labor and in the
history of American cities.”46 From the core formed
by teamster, building trades, and building service
unions, the Chicago labor movement made forays
into closely related industries, such as hotels and
restaurants, and then into the mass-production man-
ufacturing sector – the packinghouses and steel mills –
where the movement’s organizing campaigns were
often beaten up, both literally and figuratively.
Nonetheless, these unions operating in metropolitan
markets provided a sustaining organizational base.
LEGAL ATTACK AND POLITICAL COUNTERATTACK: THE
FLAT JANITORS AND CHICAGO POLITICS IN THE 1920S
The 1920s severely tested both the cartel and the Flat
Janitors’ Union, which was almost destroyed by a le-
gal attack. This legal offensive pushed the union into
even more political activity, and the union’s counter-
attack revealed the contours of the cartel in greater
clarity. In the broadest sense, the battles with em-
ployers and the courts were conflicts over redefining
the “grammar of rules,” in Katznelson’s terms, regu-
lating the exercise of power by a new institution in civ-
il society, the Chicago Flat Janitors’ Union.
The national open-shop campaign after World War
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I profited from the first Red Scare and from Attorney
General A. Mitchell Palmer’s raids against the Left. As
employers tried to roll back labor’s wartime gains, an
unprecedented wave of strikes swept the country. The
New Republic caught the mood of the moment:
There is a general disposition among the em-
ployers, the politicians and the press to treat
the labor unrest as a culpable and sinister rebel-
lion – as an autocratic anti-social demonstra-
tion of power which the American nation . . .
must suppress at any cost. They cherish this
bellicose and irreconcilable attitude of mind as
patriotic and public spirited.
The magazine emphasized the press’s role in what
quickly became a national campaign: “It is as prof-
itable to argue with the great majority of American
newspapers on a contemporary labor controversy as
it is to argue with a brass band.”47
Less well-known than the national open-shop cam-
paign were similar but distinct efforts at the state and
local level, which, of course, drew strength from the
national movement. The Chicago campaigns were
initiated and led by prominent businessmen and pro-
fessionals; describing themselves as “citizens,” their
campaigns usually began as attacks on corruption in
Chicago’s politics and economy. Typically, however,
the campaigns concentrated on corruption in the la-
bor movement, using the power of the courts to at-
tack, not simply particular corrupt trade unionists,
but also unions as institutions – one of which was the
Chicago Flat Janitors’ Union.
Quesse had been familiar with business’s use of the
police and courts since at least 1912, when two prop-
erty owners – not the police – had “arrested” him dur-
ing an organizing effort and took him to the police
station, where he was held for three days before ar-
raignment. Now, in the 1920s, business’s use of the
criminal justice system achieved new levels of sophis-
tication. The Chicago Crime Commission and the
Dailey Commission were two cases in point. Orga-
nized during the war by a committee of businessmen
concerned by the level of crime in Chicago, the
Crime Commission swung into action soon after the
armistice. Energy and organizational talent came
from the Chicago Association of Commerce, an elite
business association, which called for action against
crime in December 1918. Moving quickly, the Crime
Commission formed numerous study committees
and called on the American Protective League, a vig-
ilance group organized to enforce loyalty during
World War I, to continue its activities in Chicago after
the war. In December 1920, the Crime Commission
held a confidential meeting of government law-
enforcement agencies, several business groups, in-
cluding the Chicago Real Estate Board, and members
of the clergy. The day after this meeting six addition-
al judges were assigned to the criminal court to speed
its proceedings. By the fall of 1921, the Crime Com-
mission used its money and legal expertise to aid the
prosecution of the top ten leaders of the Flat Janitors’
Union. By this time, the Commission had became a
“centralized power in the administration of justice” in
Cook County. The Commission pursued the union
into 1924.48
The history of the Dailey Commission paralleled
that of the Crime Commission. During and especial-
ly after World War I, the Illinois Legislature received
numerous complaints about the inability of the
Chicago construction industry to respond to the de-
mand for housing, thus raising rents and home
prices. Several construction unions, for example, col-
luded with manufacturers and contractors to only use
millwork produced by a local companies, as long as
the businesses involved hired only union labor. Rais-
ing prices, sometimes astronomically, such arrange-
ments dated back to the 1890s. The Legislature
established the Dailey Commission to investigate these
practices, and it held public hearings in Chicago from
late March through June 1921. The press reported
the hearings extensively in ways that inflamed public
opinion against labor. The Commission considered
such “organized public sentiment” a precondition for
the success of its endeavors, and in its final report it
even thanked seven Chicago newspapers for “their
wholehearted co-operation.” Its report also admitted
that “the prosecution of labor leaders has been more
vigorous than that of others equally guilty,” that is,
building contractors and manufacturers; but the
Commission denied responsibility for the unequal
administration of justice.49
The Dailey Commission handed its investigations
over to special grand juries which used them as evi-
dence in indictments. Chief Justice McDonald ex-
pressed the public mood as he charged one of these
grand juries, arguing that
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many important unions in the city of Chicago
are controlled by convicts and professional
criminals, and that gunmen and convicts have
seized hold of the offices of these unions for
the sole purpose of . . . [getting] money from
the citizens of Chicago by a reign of terror, de-
stroying law and order in this great commun-
ity.50
In one sentence, McDonald expressed how the citi-
zens’ campaigns to fight crime moved from specific
corrupt individuals – and there were corrupt union
officials – to a generalized attack on labor unions as
a threat to public order. The term reign of terror be-
came common currency in newspaper reporting
about labor affairs during the next two years.
Clearly there could be no compromise with such a
challenge; and the effort to “clean up” the Chicago
building industry, and particularly its unions, took on
the air of a military campaign. This campaign
reached full force just as the Flat Janitors took the
lead in founding a new AFL affiliate, the Building Ser-
vice Employees’ International Union (BSEIU), in
April 1921. In honor of its central role in the new in-
ternational, the Flat Janitors became Local 1 in the
new organization, although they kept their old name
as well. On May 13, 1921, only three weeks after the
chartering of the BSEIU, Quesse and nine other lead-
ers of the Flat Janitors were indicted on a host of
charges ranging from conspiracy to extort money to
dynamiting buildings. They were part of the first set
of indictments associated with the Dailey Commis-
sion hearings. By the fall, over 200 labor union offi-
cials, mainly from the building trades, were under
indictment.51
After the indictments Quesse sent an open letter to
the members of his union in which he argued that the
indictments were an effort “to break up our Union”
led by the “Employers’ Association” and its chief
lawyer Dudley Taylor, who had led a successful test
case against the union in 1914 that produced the Sul-
livan injunction. Quesse was right; Taylor and the Em-
ployers’ Association were deeply involved in this new
legal offensive against the Flat Janitors. Quesse’s let-
ter continued:
We know that the Employers have control of
the Judges of the bench from time to time . . . .
now is the opportune time for us to try to elect
men to the Judicial Bench . . . whom I know, if
elected, will insure us of a fair and impartial tri-
al, not only at this time, but [in] all other cases.
He concluded with a call to resistance against the ef-
fort to break up the union: “It is our bread and but-
ter, and we are not going to let them do it . . . . We are
going to continue fighting like we know how, for your
benefit as well as ours.” Fighting “like we know how”
meant voting for the eighteen judges he listed at the
end of the letter. The eighteen composed a slate set
up by Mayor Thompson to contest a special judicial
election in June 1921. The special election was itself
part of a contemporary battle against Thompson’s
huge patronage-fueled political faction. Although
Thompson’s slate lost to a bipartisan coalition en-
dorsed by the Tribune, the Flat Janitors made friends
among the losing candidates who would help them
later. Quesse’s political initiative in this judicial elec-
tion illustrated the common pursuit of “negative” po-
litical goals by AFL unions, in which they engaged in
politics to resist the use of the state against them. The
employer’s use of the courts led the Flat Janitors into
an even stronger alliance with Mayor Thompson.52
The Flat Janitors’ leaders had time to organize for
this special judicial election because their trial was de-
layed for seven months after the indictments in May.
The delay may have resulted from the conflict in the
construction industry: the prosecution of the Flat
Janitors was really part of this larger battle. In the fall
of 1921 – while over 200 union leaders in the build-
ing trades were under indictment – construction
unions and contractors agreed to an arbitration of
their bitter differences. They chose Kenesaw Moun-
tain Landis, famous for restoring the reputation of
professional baseball after the 1919 White Sox scan-
dals. Landis ruled in favor of the contractors on prac-
tically every issue, even imposing a lower scale of
wages than they had anticipated paying. Employers
organized the Citizens’ Committee to Enforce the
Landis Award – usually simply called the Landis
Award – to insure that the construction unions com-
plied with Landis’s decision. It was by no means clear
that they would, despite the mass of indictments.53
Among its many activities, the Landis Award hired
Edwin J. Raber, an associate of Dudley Taylor’s, to aid
the state’s attorney in the case against the Flat Jani-
tors. Raber began work in November 1921, well be-
fore the union leaders’ trial began in January.
Although paid by a private organization of employers,
Raber represented the state’s attorney at the trial and
in several of the subsequent proceedings against the
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union, including hearings before the state’s Board of
Paroles and Pardons in 1924. Raber worked closely
with Dudley Taylor, who claimed that the prosecution
of the Flat Janitors “was based on an investigation”
made by the Employers’ Association, which hired
him. This blending of private interest and public pow-
er in the administration of justice was standard 
practice, and even institutionalized in the Crime
Commission, which often served as an “unofficial
prosecuting authority.”54
The Flat Janitors’ leaders simply assumed that em-
ployers powerfully influenced Chicago’s judicial sys-
tem; and, in fact, Quesse’s open letter to the
membership called on the union to do the same. The
leaders suspected that the seven-month delay in their
trial was part of the building owners’ negotiating
strategy: the owners were using their power over the
state’s attorney to time the trial so that it coincided
with the annual contract negotiations, which always
began in December and were usually resolved in Jan-
uary. Refusing to come to terms in December, the
building owners, so the labor leaders thought, hoped
to provoke the union into a strike while all of its top
leaders were on trial. A leaderless union on strike, es-
pecially one composed of unskilled black and immi-
grant workers, could presumably be destroyed. When
January and the trial arrived, Local 1’s leaders re-
fused to initiate a strike and won their case. The jury
could not reach a verdict and was dismissed on Feb-
ruary 4, 1922. Nine of the twelve jurors had voted for
acquittal; and, out of ten counts in the indictment,
“conspiracy to boycott” was the only one on which the
jury came close to agreeing.55
Another victory for the Flat Janitors soon followed.
Early in 1922, just as the trial of the leaders began, the
Real Estate Board and the union submitted the an-
nual contract to arbitration. The arbitrator agreed to
by the union and the Board was Judge Bernard
Barasa, a municipal court judge specializing in rent
matters. He had been one of Quesse’s eighteen judi-
cial endorsements the previous June, garnering the
most votes on the slate; and he almost certainly owed
his current judgeship to the Thompson organization.
The Real Estate Board had to be aware of Barasa’s po-
litical connections when it agreed to him as arbitra-
tor. Why the Board agreed to Barasa’s appointment
poses a conundrum, although it may have felt some
of the pressure claimed by Oscar Nelson and Quesse.
According to Nelson, vice president of the Chicago
Federation of Labor, the union threatened to publish
information about “certain members of the real es-
tate board, their transactions, their manipulations,
painting contracts, plumbing contracts; and how they
juggled the situation.” Quesse said they pushed the
Board to arbitration with “publicity.” Nelson and
Quesse likely overstated their influence. The Real Es-
tate Board was not the same employers group most
actively prosecuting the case against the Flat Janitors,
and it was probably more concerned with getting a fa-
vorable contract than destroying the union. The
Board’s history of negotiating with the Flat Janitors
over the past four years indicated that containing 
labor-management conflict within the cartel was ac-
ceptable to it.56
Judge Barasa’s role as arbitrator publicly sanc-
tioned the powerful positions of the Flat Janitors and
the Real Estate Board in the cartel, just as Police Chief
Fitzmorris’s arbitration had done the year previously.
Barasa went further than Fitzmorris, however, when
he announced his decision on March 18, 1922. His
ruling improved working conditions while preserving
the current wage rates, including the “sliding scale”
that had automatically increased the janitors’ wages
during the postwar inflation. More important, Barasa
created a Permanent Arbitration Board consisting of
one member appointed by the union, one by the Real
Estate Board, and himself as chairman. He estab-
lished the Arbitration Board for five years, after which
the system would be reexamined. All labor disputes
had to be submitted to it, and no strikes were allowed
during its deliberations. Changes in wage rates would
be considered every March 1, a concession to the Real
Estate Board, which did not want strikes in the depth
of winter when tenants were most vulnerable.57
Barasa’s decision institutionalized the cartel with
its three key players – the Flat Janitors, the Real Es-
tate Board, and Thompson’s political faction. It
would be a mistake to see Barasa’s decision as the
state (through the courts) instituting a corporatist sys-
tem, because the decisions of the Permanent Arbi-
tration Board lacked the force of law and because the
union actually enforced them, not the government.
This arbitration mechanism presupposed the con-
sent of the parties involved, as had all such proposals
made by the Flat Janitors since their initial organizing
campaign in 1902. The fact that neither the union
nor the Real Estate Board challenged Barasa’s deci-
sion in court indicated that they consented. The Flat
Janitor’s role in the cartel under the Permanent Ar-
bitration Board was analogous to that of the United
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Mine Workers under the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act (NIRA) in the first New Deal. The closest the
United States has come to a corporatist system, the
NIRA was declared unconstitutional within a few
years of its birth. During its short life, agreements in
the bituminous coal industry were actually enforced
by the United Mine Workers Union, and thus the
NIRA meant not corporatism, or even a cartel man-
aged by the state, so much as union enforced collec-
tive bargaining, which profited from state sanction-
ing. Analogously, Barasa did not represent the state
so much as Big Bill Thompson, whose political pow-
er was indispensable to the maintenance of the sys-
tem. This quickly became clear as the legal attacks on
the Flat Janitors intensified.58
Neither the trial nor Barasa’s decision calmed the
militant opponents of the Flat Janitors’ Union. A pe-
riod of public recrimination and hysteria followed
the dismissal of the jury, heightened by the fact that
the trials of the construction union leaders were not
going much better for the prosecution than the case
against the janitors. Led by the Tribune, the press went
on the offensive. Quesse in particular felt the sting of
the Tribune’s rebuke. He concluded that,
If you are a power of any kind politically 
and you don’t cooperate with the Chicago Trib-
une, you are nailed and convicted before you
start . . . . The Tribune and the other newspa-
pers went after me so hard that everybody
thought that this fellow Quesse had horns on
him.59
The press also attacked the jury in the janitors’ case.
It accused one juror of taking bribes from Quesse,
and both of them were indicted on March 25, 1922,
for jury tampering; bail was set at $15,000 each. That
charge was subsequently dropped. A grand jury in-
dictment was sought against Local 1’s lawyer. The
foreman of the jury in the first janitors’ case, who had
been employed by a bank for over twenty years, was
fired under suspicious circumstances. Even judges be-
gan publicly calling on juries to reach convictions,
while other judges criticized their colleagues for their
behavior. By late March, the public mood had be-
come so poisoned that the Church League for In-
dustrial Democracy, a Protestant reform group, ran
an advertisement in the Tribune saying that, “Daily
and copiously the public is being fed with stories of
‘the Crimes of Labor’,” while employers departed for
their vacations in exotic places. Granting that there
was corruption in the labor movement, the Church
League argued that, “At the same time the whole of
Labor should not be condemned for the vicious acts
of certain leaders.”60
According to a prominent Illinois labor leader, the
spring of 1922 was a time when “men of all classes lost
their heads.”61 One reason was increasing violence,
much of it associated with conflict in the construction
industry over the Landis Award. On May 9, 1922, two
policemen were gunned down in association with a
bombing at an open-shop glazier’s firm. Police ar-
rested 163 construction union leaders, although only
three were subsequently indicted. According to the
magazine of the Association of Commerce, the
killings “aroused the law abiding element in Chicago
to a level of indignation unequaled since the Hay-
market riots.”62 In this atmosphere, the second trial
of the Flat Janitors’ leaders began.
The hearing of evidence in the second trial began
on May 31, 1922, after a six-week effort to select a im-
partial jury. The mood of both the press and the
state’s attorney was illustrated during the first two
days of June when, just after the trial began, the Trib-
une reported that the state’s attorney had appointed
eleven new special assistants to “assist him in the work
of suppressing labor terrorism in Chicago,” while the
next day it noted that six new judges in the Criminal
Court would help “clean up” the 170 pending “labor
‘terrorist’” cases. Disregarding such hostile public
opinion, Quesse had not fought a retrial, mistakenly
thinking he and his fellow leaders would be vindicat-
ed. They were tried on the same charges as in the first
trial and under the same judge, despite their request
for a new one. They were all convicted on June 9 and
sentenced on June 29 to from one to five years in the
state penitentiary. According to the Tribune, the con-
viction as “the greatest victory thus far obtained by
the state against labor terrorists.”63
The actual charges on which they had been con-
victed were subject to dispute, and this ambiguity be-
came part of their appeals. The jury named one of the
ten counts of the indictment specifically – Number 7
– but referred to others, unnamed. Judge Swanson
concluded that they were convicted on the seventh
count, the longest one, which included both conspir-
acy to boycott and conspiracy to extort money. They
were thus acquitted on the nine other counts, which
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included, among other things, conspiracy to defraud
building owners and to dynamite their buildings. In
its ruling the Court of Appeals stressed only the con-
spiracy to boycott, finding that alleging extortion was
“unnecessary,” since conspiracy to boycott was itself a
crime in Illinois. In its decision the Illinois Supreme
Court did not refer to boycotting, stressing their con-
viction on conspiracy to extort money. Both courts de-
nied Local 1’s appeals, the decision of the supreme
court coming in December 1923, a year and a half af-
ter the sentencing. Illinois courts had decided that Lo-
cal 1’s leaders were guilty of “conspiracy,” and the
strongest case was on “conspiracy to boycott.”64
Quesse had already begun organizing politically to
reverse the original verdict. When the Illinois
Supreme Court denied the appeal, this political mo-
bilization moved into high gear, dwarfing the previ-
ous effort to elect judges two years previously. The
Chicago and Illinois Federations of Labor helped the
Flat Janitors organize a state-wide petition campaign
for a pardon by the governor. Janitors throughout the
city carried petitions through their buildings, pro-
voking building owners to write the governor in an ef-
fort to disparage their significance: “Janitors in
buildings operated by us have been circulating peti-
tions misrepresenting facts in the case and a number
of women in our buildings have signed these peti-
tions with an absolute misunderstanding of what they
are signing.” The campaign collected 228,000 signa-
tures throughout the state. The union also succeed-
ed in having roughly sixty apartment building
owners, all members of the Chicago Board of Real Es-
tate, write the governor favoring a pardon. The lead-
ers of the Real Estate Board countered with their own
campaign against the pardon which, not surprisingly,
produced more letters, about 300. Compared to la-
bor’s effort, however, the Board’s campaign was mod-
est and not commensurate with its financial and
political resources.65
To support a pardon, Quesse helped organize the
Cook County Wage Earners League, a sort of labor
political action committee composed of a wide range
of local union leaders. A power in local politics for the
rest of the decade, the League used its influence to
aid union organizing. The League actively supported
Governor Len Small’s 1924 campaign for reelection,
and at the same time Quesse also made himself per-
sonally useful to Small, who thanked Quesse for
“guarding my interests.”66 Len Small needed help, in
part because he had been indicted – but then ac-
quitted – in 1921 for embezzlement and conspiracy
during his earlier term as state treasurer. Suspicions
remained, and Small had to pay a substantial settle-
ment in a related civil suit. Quesse was not above flat-
tery to get what he wanted from Small. In a speech at
the initiation of the pardon proceeding in January
1924, Quesse said,
Whether the Governor does a favor for me or
not, I think he has done enough for organized
labor to ask every single labor man to give him
their support. I think he is the greatest Gover-
nor we have ever had.67
In addition to flattery, Quesse used the influence that
came through his years of cooperation with Big Bill
Thompson. Thompson and Small were close allies,
and to be reelected Small needed the active support
of Thompson’s numerous friends in Chicago.68
Chaired by Governor Small, the Board of Paroles
and Pardons met in Springfield on April 11, 1924, to
hear the case of the Flat Janitors’ leaders. Quesse was
joined by forty-five labor leaders from throughout the
state. He also laid on the table the petitions with
228,000 signatures supporting a pardon. Opposing a
pardon was Edwin Raber, representing the State’s At-
torney of Cook County, and indirectly, his employer,
the Landis Award. Joining Raber was J. L. Vette, a vice
president of the Chicago Real Estate Board. The pre-
ponderance of both institutional and voting power
that Quesse had brought with him into the room
helped determine the outcome in the Flat Janitors’
favor. So did the testimony during a long day of hear-
ings that began early and lasted well into the evening.
Delivering the first and most important testimony
in favor of a pardon was Willard M. McEwen, the
union’s lawyer at the hearing and a former judge in
the Cook County Superior Court. The fact that he
had served eight years in the same court system that
produced the conviction added to the weight of his
testimony. Throughout his presentation, McEwen in-
dicted the legitimacy of intervention in the Cook
County judicial system by employers and the Chicago
Crime Commission. In addition to technical points
about the counts in the indictment, McEwen had two
major arguments. First of all, he attacked the law of
conspiracy in Illinois, arguing that it was easily ex-
ploited by employers as a weapon against labor – an
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argument that had contemporary academic support.
Originally passed in 1874, McEwen argued, the Illi-
nois law was so vague that it could be interpreted to
cover practically any labor initiative threatening em-
ployers. As used in the janitors’ case, the law of con-
spiracy allowed for so many charges to be piled up
that the jury concluded some crime must have been
committed; thus it convicted on the vaguest charge,
conspiracy to boycott, in order to cover the ground.
Broad in scope and vague in content, the law of con-
spiracy was a tool, wrapped in public garb, easily avail-
able for the gain of private interests. McEwen had to
indict the law of conspiracy because Quesse and his
fellow leaders were in fact guilty of “conspiracy to boy-
cott” every time they struck a building hiring non-
union labor. Boycotting services of all types was their
main weapon. The Illinois labor movement consid-
ered such tactics legitimate, though the law did not.69
The conspiracy law was exploited in this way, con-
tinued McEwen, when employers used their power
and wealth to gain access to the state’s attorney’s of-
fice. The state’s attorney even used private lawyers,
like Edwin Raber, to collect evidence and try cases.
With the state’s attorney and the grand jury behind
them, these private interests
always . . . appeared to be the ones who are
standing upon law and order, always the pub-
licity goes to the lawlessness of the working
man. So it has built up a public [sentiment]
that weighs heavily and which the working-man
has had to combat.
Cooperative judges encouraged grand juries to
broaden their investigations beyond their original in-
tent as a way to prejudice public opinion in the city
against labor. According to McEwen, the press did the
same, the Tribune with unbridled enthusiasm. Such
use of the criminal justice system as an “instrument”
for private purposes was evident in the indictment of
the building trades unionists after the Dailey Com-
mission hearings in 1921. Once, said McEwen, it be-
came clear that the building trades unions would
abide by the Landis Award the state’s attorney simply
“struck off,” or withdrew, the indictments of over 200
of their leaders. The trials of the janitors were part of
the same misuse of public authority to intimidate the
labor movement. Thus, said McEwen, the convictions
of Local 1’s leaders had lost any public character, re-
maining only as the gains of private interest. They
should therefore be overturned. In this bravura per-
formance, McEwen utilized a prevailing concept of
separating public power and private interest that had
helped reformers in the Progressive Era attack polit-
ical machines – concepts that also made it difficult to
legitimate the state’s involvement in managing car-
tels, much less setting up corporatist systems.70
Compared to McEwen, the two opponents of a 
pardon were by no means as coherent or effective,
mainly because they represented different business
interests with different agendas and distinct attitudes
toward labor. Edwin J. Raber again represented the
state’s attorney and the Landis Award, as he had at
the trial. His testimony repeated the charges and
summarized the evidence presented at the trial, most
of which had not been accepted by the jury. He
stressed the familiar themes of conspiracy and labor
terrorism. There was a pro forma quality to Raber’s
presentation, probably indicating that the Landis
Award had written off the whole affair after achieving
its larger goals of pressuring the building trades
unions into accepting Judge Landis’s arbitration de-
cision. The fact that the state’s attorney himself did
not even bother to attend reinforces this interpreta-
tion. For whatever reasons, and despite its open-shop
predilections, the business coalition hiring Raber did
not expend the considerable resources that would
have been necessary to defeat the well-organized
union campaign for a pardon.71
In his testimony, C. L. Vette, a vice president of the
Chicago Real Estate Board, deflated Raber’s presen-
tation by his faint support for it. Vette also revealed
divisions within the Real Estate Board about dealing
with the Flat Janitors. In January, the officers of the
Board had called on members to write the governor
opposing a pardon, and a membership meeting
shortly afterward passed a resolution against a par-
don as well. Yet, by the pardon hearings in April,
there were letters from Board members both sup-
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A construction boom in the housing industry may have con-
tributed to the decline of interest in prosecuting the janitors. A
shortage of housing immediately after World War I sparked the Dai-
ley Commission’s investigation of the construction unions, while
the passing of the shortage lessened public support for “cleaning
up” the construction industry. On the construction boom see
Chicago Real Estate, June 1922, 23.
porting and opposing a pardon; and the organization
only managed to send a vice president to state its case
at the hearings in the presence of forty-five labor lead-
ers from throughout the state. Vette testified that,
“While it is true the Real Estate Board had no part
whatever in this persecution [word used in the tran-
script] so far as I know they were not interested in it
as a Board.” He said this even though the Board of
Pardons and Paroles had a copy of the January reso-
lution against a pardon, as well as letters from officers
of the Real Estate Board taking the same position.
Vette went on to say,
Now whether or not they [the Flat Janitors]
committed these outrages, you gentlemen know
just as much about it as I do. The information
I have on that subject comes from hearing 
Mr. Raber tell his story. I have no reason to
doubt it.
This was simply disingenuous. As the Real Estate
Board’s attorney for ten years previously, Vette must
have heard the numerous complaints from Board
members about the Flat Janitors’ tactics, including
sabotage against buildings during strikes. Vette’s tes-
timony revealed a Board divided about the Flat Jani-
tors’ Union and unwilling or unable to mobilize its
enormous resources to put the union’s leaders in jail.
Enough of the Board’s leadership was satisfied with
the cartel – formalized two years earlier by Judge
Barasa – to keep the Board from disrupting the sys-
tem by decapitating Flat Janitors’ Union, a task that
would have been politically expensive as well.72
Conflicting attitudes among the Board’s members
reinforced the leaders’ ambivalence. The fact that the
Real Estate Board only produced about 300 letters
against a pardon, when the organization had over
5,800 members, illustrated that the members were
not united in righteous rage against the Flat Janitors.
This is not to say that they liked the union either.
Some of the Board’s members held the union re-
sponsible for creating attitudes among janitors in-
appropriate for people of their class, an affront
heightened by the janitors’ being overwhelmingly im-
migrants and African Americans. One owner wrote,
“The janitors of our buildings were not amenable to
reason during the Quesse regime . . . they virtually as-
sumed the role of dictators.” These dictatorial atti-
tudes usually involved a janitor’s refusal to do work,
such as nailing loose boards, that the labor contract
reserved for other trade unions. Another owner was
fined by Quesse for paying an African American jan-
itor below the union scale. Quesse “pre-emptorily
[sic] assessed a fine against me” and, even worse, be-
haved rudely: “I was never so abused or mistreated in
my life and in the most profane way.” Such class per-
ceptions reinforced these owners’ anger against the
changes brought by the union, including higher
wages and precisely defined work tasks. Other mem-
bers of the Real Estate Board saw compensating ben-
efits to the union.73
About sixty letters from Real Estate Board mem-
bers favored a pardon. Some of them followed a 
standard format proposed by the union, naturally ex-
onerating the leaders of the numerous charges
against them. These letters, all directed to Governor
Small, also noted that the union’s members “have
been strong supporters of yours and William Hale
Thompson,” a political point reinforced by the peti-
tions favoring a pardon signed by almost a quarter of
a million voters. The more original letters illustrated
why the Real Estate Board was divided about the
union. One owner wrote that the union’s opponents
simply “did not feel disposed to pay the scale” of
union wages: “I am on the side representing capital,
but I believe in being fair to everyone . . . many Chica-
go property owners are glad to receive the increased
rentals, but would like to keep the janitor’s wage as
low as possible.” Being “fair” was feasible for such
owners if the universal enforcement of the union con-
tract protected them from non-union competition.
The Flat Janitors’ Union was strong enough in the
metropolitan labor market to provide such universal
enforcement, at least if its top ten leaders were not in
jail. At the pardon hearings, Oscar Nelson, vice pres-
ident of the Chicago Federation of Labor, stated the
point more generally, arguing that “the average in-
vestor in real estate” realized that the Flat Janitors’
Union “has stabilized the real estate market.” The
Board had addressed this constituency when it re-
ported on Barasa’s ruling in March 1922, emphasiz-
ing the judge’s commitment to providing “‘steady
uninterrupted service’” by competent janitors.
Enough members appreciated such stability to make
the Real Estate Board ambivalent about sending the
union’s leaders to the state penitentiary.74
On April 12, 1924, Governor Len Small pardoned
Quesse and the other leaders – four days after he had
won a hotly contested primary election for the Re-
publican nomination for governor. The candidate
opposing him had been heavily supported by the
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Tribune, which accused Small of multiple charges of
corruption. Both the Illinois Federation of Labor and
the Flat Janitors had heavily supported Small, and
they continued to do so through Small’s victory in the
November elections.75
The legal assault on the union in the 1920s pushed
it to mobilize political resources that it had cultivated
earlier during World War I. In the process, it became
even more important as a political interest group in
Chicago’s power centers, building networks of influ-
ence that sustained not only itself but also the larger
Chicago labor movement as well as William Hale
Thompson’s political faction. The men involved in
these networks participated in Quesse’s funeral in
February 1927. Officially he died of cancer, but the
oral tradition of the union attributes his death to in-
juries suffered in battles with the police and private
guards in the early days of organizing. Quesse re-
mained active almost to the end, writing letters of sup-
port to candidates for local office several days before
he died. He also anointed his successor in a “letter
from beyond the grave” read to a mass membership
meeting soon after his death. William Hale Thomp-
son addressed the same mournful assembly.76
Leaders of the Chicago labor movement stood out
prominently at Quesse’s mammoth funeral service, as
did five Roman Catholic priests and a crowd of pub-
lic officials. Participating as honorary pallbearers were
Governor Len Small, a United States Senator from
Illinois, 8 Illinois State Senators, 22 Illinois State As-
semblymen, 14 Chicago Aldermen, and 31 judges –
one of whom was Bernard Barasa. Also participating
was Anton Cermak, who would defeat Thompson in
the mayoralty election of 1931 and go on to found the
famous Chicago Democratic machine. Quesse told
the Board of Pardons and Paroles that, “I never knew
anything in my life but fight for what you want”; in
Chicago during the 1920s, this meant turning his
huge union local into a powerful political interest
group with wide influence in the city and state.77
THE FLAT JANITORS IN LABOR AND URBAN HISTORY
The history of the Flat Janitors’ Union contributes to
the current reevaluation of the AFL, particularly by
adding to knowledge of local unions rather than con-
centrating on the national organization and its poli-
cies. AFL unions have typically been seen as exclusive,
racially segregated, male craft organizations pursuing
narrow economic goals and conservative politics. Re-
cently, such labor historians as Dorothy Sue Cobble
and Richard Schneirov have criticized and expanded
this view by analyzing a wider range of AFL unions
and by reinterpreting the local labor movements in
which they participated. Cobble applied her defini-
tion of occupational unionism to waitresses’ unions’
efforts to organize unskilled and semiskilled women
working in scattered small firms. Providing a coun-
terpart to the waitresses among unskilled male work-
ers, the Flat Janitors’ Union broadens the import of
Cobble’s analysis. The examples of both these AFL
unions in the first third of the twentieth century 
argues for a reexamination of the federal unions
through which the AFL tried to organize the un-
skilled work force. Since federal unions were inside
the AFL but outside any particular national craft
union, they more precisely met the organizational
needs of the unskilled. The Flat Janitors were AFL
Federal Union 14332 before becoming Local 1 of the
new BSEIU.78
Richard Schneirov’s conception of a “new union-
ism” that emerged in Chicago by the 1890s places the
discussion of AFL locals of unskilled workers in a
wider context. The Knights of Labor’s effort to orga-
nize both the skilled and unskilled provided a goal for
the Chicago labor movement after the Knights’ de-
cline. In Chicago, AFL craft unions, particularly those
in construction, tried various techniques for appeal-
ing to the unskilled, including advocating popular is-
sues such as the minimum wage and shorter hours
and promoting separate locals for workers such as
hod carriers. These locals were then linked to other
unions through participation in umbrella organiza-
tions such as the Building Trades Council. At the
same time, this new unionism sought to build
stronger locals by raising dues, increasing benefits,
and employing full-time staff – measures that have
defined business unionism but which did not neces-
sarily imply the conservatism usually associated with
the term. The people manning the new institutional
apparatus of the unions had been through the up-
heavals of the 1880s and wanted stability while keep-
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ing alive some of their earlier goals. The efforts to or-
ganize unskilled workers in the 1890s attested 
to that. Finally, the new unionism tried to advance
working-class interests by controlling markets for la-
bor and sometimes for products, an effort that some-
times required cooperation with employers. Union
label campaigns, for example, rewarded employers
for union contracts by providing a reliable market for
their products. The union label could also be used to
protect the Chicago market from outside competi-
tion.79
The Flat Janitors’ Union illustrated how several fea-
tures of Schneirov’s new unionism extended into the
1920s, most obviously the union’s effort to control
the labor market and willingness to cooperate with
employers to do so. The Flat Janitors also profited
from the efforts of other Chicago locals to organize
unskilled workers. The union simply could not have
been organized without the cooperation of the team-
sters in particular, but also the building trades, all of
whom honored the janitors’ pickets of particular
buildings they were striking. The janitors probably
even derived from the building trades the idea of
numberous trades striking one employer, instead of
one trade striking across its own industry. The prac-
tice orginated from two decisive strikes in 1891 in
which stronger building trades unions with labor
agreements supported those without.80 As noted ear-
lier, the janitors also took their model of arbitration
from the building trades. The Flat Janitors’ Union
was an integral part of a Chicago labor movement try-
ing to organize a wide range of skilled and unskilled
workers under the aegis of the AFL.
The history of the Flat Janitors’ Union can also con-
tribute to reinterpreting the AFL’s policy of volun-
tarism. Voluntarism presupposed that the AFL would
not form its own labor party; rather, it would advance
its political interests through friendly forces in both
major parties, while pursuing its economic goals
through organization at the workplace. Voluntarism
allowed the organization to tilt toward the Democra-
tic party during the Progressive Era, particularly in an
effort to counteract the use of court injunctions
against its unions.
Quesse practiced American Federation of Labor
politics in the streets, and even in the basements
where the janitors worked, using the full range of 
political tactics from grass roots organizing to deals
with powerful contending organizations. In Quesse’s
hands, voluntarism meant partisan politics of a dis-
tinctive kind aimed mainly, though not exclusively, at
achieving the traditional AFL goal of getting the state
out of the way. In other words, the Flat Janitors pur-
sued mainstream AFL goals with political means anal-
ogous to those used by national labor organizations
beginning in the New Deal, tactics which made them,
in J. David Greenstone’s terms, into a “Democratic
party campaign organization.”81 The Flat Janitors, of
course, practically became a campaign organization
of a Republican faction in Chicago. Such an expand-
ed view of labor union politics in this era can open up
new dimensions of urban political systems, especially
when linked to the concept of metropolitan union-
ism.
Barbara Newell, Richard Schneirov, and Colin Gor-
don have all addressed this concept. Gordon defines
it as “a form of collective bargaining that groups work-
ers by region and occupation rather than by work site
and industry,” which he finds most prominently in lo-
cal markets of northern and western cities from the
Progressive Era through World War II. There, metro-
politan unionism concentrated in some skilled
trades, particularly construction; in unskilled service
occupations such as delivery drivers, janitors, and eli-
vators operators; and, in local manufacturing, most
famously in the needle trades. Politically, some met-
ropolitan unions actually forged “a distinct identity
and agenda in local politics,” as well as supported
each other in organizing drives and occasionaly joint-
ly supplied services such health care. The concept of
a political cartel employed here helps analyze the pol-
itics of such metropolitan unions. The Flat Janitors
needed political power to achieve their collective bar-
gaining goals, most obviously because the arbitration
mechanism they always preferred frequently broke
down; and it took Big Bill Thomspon to fix it. This
function of political power for the Flat Janitors took
the politics of their metropolitan unionism beyond
the AFL’s negative goal of keeping the state at bay and
placed it at the center of the institution’s life. Politics
for the Flat Janitors was a policy instrument as well as
a shield against the state. Perhaps the Flat Janitors
were unique in this regard, but the politics of other
metropolitan unions could be fruitfully addressed
with the Flat Janitors and their political cartel in
mind.82
Similarly, the example of the Flat Janitors could aid
in rethinking the political economy of urban ma-
chines. Students of labor and political machines have
been most interested in how bosses and their minions
in the wards influenced the politics of the labor move-
ment. Typically, and accurately, labor historians have
seen the machines coopting labor leaders and miti-
gating the radicalism of labor’s political demands. A
secondary concern has been the role of political ma-
chines in assimilating the workers as immigrants into
American industrial society through participation in
the major parties. In other words, most scholarship
on labor and machines has emphasized the political
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side of political economy. The history of the Flat Jan-
itors, as well as the concepts of metropolitan union-
ism and political cartels, help reveal the economic
role of the machines in metropolitan economies and
thus the roots of their power beyond the ballot box.83
From this perspective, one can see urban machines
addressing one of the central problems of the early
twentieth century – the control of markets in a de-
mocratic polity. The progressive movement is most fa-
mous for its creative initiatives on this issue, but the
bosses and their allies came at it from their own 
angle, and, in a sense, from the bottom up. Their lo-
cal or metropolitan efforts at market management
can be compared to the progressives’ endeavors
aimed at the same goal on the state and national lev-
els. And, finally, a political economy that contextual-
ized and historicized machines within a metropolitan
environment would help address Katznelson’s con-
cern with the “partial truth” of treating the state as an
independent variable to explain working-class forma-
tion and labor politics. Labor and capital would both
appear as shaping the capabilities and limits of ma-
chines and city governments, even as machines and
the local state did the same for business and labor.84
Finally, Katznelson used one the most creative stu-
dents of labor and politics, J. David Greenstone, to
raise the issue of liberalism in America as a “bound-
ary condition” setting paramaters around the coun-
try’s political life, even as its own character was at
stake in periods of great crisis, such as the Civil War,
the Progressive Era, and the New Deal.85 It may seem
presumptuous to consider the history of the Flat Jan-
itors in the presence of such historical dramas, but it’s
worth considering nonetheless for the light it might
shed on the import of local politics in America. The
Flat Janitors were a huge multi-racial, interethnic
union of unskilled workers. Their sheer institutional
presence combined with the articulation of their in-
terests pushed against the prevailing “grammar of
rules” defining legal union practice and, more gen-
erally, the exercise of collective power. The class di-
mension of these conflicts was articulated by the
petition favoring a pardon for Quesse and the nine
other leaders circulated throughout the state by the
Illinois Federation of Labor. It argued that organiz-
ing tactics ruled illegal by the courts were considered
legitimate by workers: “Labor Organizations that
have built up and dignified Labor in all civilized
countries are concerned over acts deemed innocent
and justifiable by the great mass of laborers, but the
right to do which is denied.”86 In the broadest sense,
the character of American liberalism was at stake in
conflicts like these, at least liberalism as defined by
the Illinois Legislature and the Circuit Courts of
Cook County. Was it wide enough to accept union
boycotts of buildings not hiring union janitors? The
courts said no; and the labor movement, in alliance
with Big Bill Thompson, said yes. This was an ongo-
ing, ferocious battle taking place in local and state
politics between the great periods of national crisis
when the character of American liberalism shifted in
decisive ways. Such local conflicts helped define the
terms in which the larger battles were fought.
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